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In Memory of Victoria Kreps
Fig. 1. Victoria in the lecture hall at Mathematical-Mechanical faculty, 1967.
Victoria Kreps was assigned to the laboratory of game theory and operations
research of the Leningrad Division of the Central Institute for Economics and Math-
ematics in 1968, after nishing the Mathematical-Mechanical faculty of Leningrad
State University. Even though the eld was new to her, in two months, she obtained
her rst result in game theory, proving that stochastic independence is the only form
of dependence of the players' mixed strategies such that every nite strategic game
admits a Nash equilibrium [1, 5]. This result assumed that players have access to a
common randomization device ve years before R. Aumann introduced the concept
of a correlated equilibrium, and such settings gained popularity.
In the 70s and 80s, Victoria did a lot of applied research. It was not a good time
for game theory in the Soviet Union since the eld dealt with conict and com-
petition, which was problematic under Soviet ideology. Despite this, she published
two papers [2, 3] in the International Journal of Game Theory, then the leading
journal in game theory; an achievement that is certainly unique and almost impos-
sible at that time. The paper [2] was devoted to the uniqueness of equilibrium in
bimatrix games, and [3] extended the analysis to games of more than two players.
In 1980, Victoria defended her Ph.D. thesis Vector spaces of games admitting an
equilibrium, which was greatly delayed due to the anti-semitic climate of the time.
In the 90s, Victoria started to work in a new direction emerging from the works
of R. Aumann and M. Maschler  repeated games with incomplete information.
These were the most fruitful years of her academic career. In this type of game,
the less informed player infers information about the state from the history of
more informed player's actions. No closed-form solutions for these games were then
known. In a series of papers, Victoria and V. Domansky identied and studied in
detail several classes of repeated games having explicit solutions [6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14,
16, 19]. The paper [9] was the rst to establish the connection between repeated
games and problems of optimal transportation, which 20 years later become an
important tool in the study of these games. Starting with [11], a number of papers
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were devoted to models of nancial markets giving an endogenous explanation of
random walk behavior occurring in price dynamics through the masking actions of
the insider. The basic model with continuous prices was introduced by B. De Meyer
and H. Moussa Saley; V. Kreps and V. Domansky extended the model by assuming
the minimal currency unit, which surprisingly changed the long-run equilibrium
behavior and allowed them to describe the equilibrium explicitly in a variety of
settings. These results are well known internationally and became the foundation of
the long-term friendship with the French and Israeli schools of game theory, many
research visits, and connections. Victoria also continued to study questions about
the structure and uniqueness of equilibrium [5, 8, 12, 17, 22].
In 2010, Victoria defended her Habilitation thesis Strategic randomization in
making competitive economic decisions: a game theory approach [13]. It was de-
voted to the game-theoretic consequences of asymmetry of information in nancial
markets, as well as the problem of ranking on the basis of multi-dimensional data.
Victoria was open to new problems and, in the last ten years, collaborated exten-
sively with younger colleagues, e.g., [15, 18, 22]. Two students, M. Sandomirskaya
and F. Sandomirskiy, defended their Ph.Ds under her supervision.
Victoria was a talented organizer, able to nd unexpected solutions to seemingly
hopeless situations. She played a key role in organizing the rst international game
theory conferences in St. Petersburg in 1996 and 2001. In 2015, largely due to
her energy and resourcefulness, the International Game Theory Laboratory was
founded at the Higher School of Economics at St. Petersburg, led from the start
by H. Moulin. She was active in the research life of the laboratory and spared no
eort in its development, helping to solve complicated organizational matters. In
the last few years, all the scientic and administrative activity of the laboratory
of Theoretical Economics at the Institute of Regional Economic Studies also came
under her care, which she headed and to which she attracted a number of talented
young researchers.
Fig. 2. Victoria in the same lecture hall at the alumni meeting, 2018.
Victoria, or, to everyone, simply Vita, had many friends. She was always inter-
ested in people with all their successes and failures and was genuinely interested in
everything that happened in their lives. The problems of others were her own. If
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someone needed help, she spared no eort to assist. Due to Victoria, many scientists
started on the path to success, now working all over the world. She possessed an
unfaltering sense of dignity, and even those who were used to talking to others from
on high, would never permit themselves to do so in her presence. She was a very
strong, determined person, never despaired, and never gave up. Already seriously
ill, she wrote three papers [20, 21, 22] and continued her work until her last day.
Her colleagues and friends across the world grieve for her passing.
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